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THE READING OF LAWYERS
More than five centuries ago lawyers placed a high
value on reading by establishing an important defence in
criminal cases, which was called the benefit of clergy, and
was available only to those who could read.
In more recent times, within the memory of most
of us, it was customary to say that a law student was
reading law.
And even to-day we occasionally hear men spoken of
as well read lawyers.
But we know that at present among lawyers reading
is almost a lost art. Lawyers as a rule no longer read.
A few days ago I asked a lawyer whether he had read
a famous law book from which I had gotten much delight,
and he replied that he did not read any law unless he
could sell it.
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The implication of his statement was obvious, and
adequately reflects, I think, the attitude of many members
of the bar. They read only such law as will answer questions presented by the cases in which they are presently
employed, They read only such law as present pressing
emergencies immediately require.
Throughout the country at present there is an ever
rising murmur about the. unfitness and inefficiency of lawyers, which is finding expression in increasingly insistent
demands for higher standards of fitness for the practice
of law.
Unfortunately, however, the remedies proposed are
not designed to cure the evil of which complaint is made.
The evil complained of is ignorance and inefficiency in
the present bar. The remedy proposed is a higher standard
of training for admission to the bar.
The American lawyer needs two courses of education;
one to fit him to study what the law is and how it should
be applied, and one to accompany and direct him in doing
what he has thus been fitted for. His first course will
occupy the whole period of his youth; the second will
occupy the whole remainder of his life. Three years of
his early manhood should be devoted to legal study from
the standpoint of one who hopes to be a lawyer; the rest
of his time on earth should be devoted to legal study from
the standpoint of one who is a lawyer.
The alleged inefficiency of the American bar is due, I
think, not to the fact that men are admitted to the bar
who are unfit to begin the practice of law, but to the
fact that members of the bar have not kept themselves
fit to continue the practice of law.
The law is not a static thing. Its field is constantly
enlarging. Its content is continually changing. If any one
can feel that he has mastered it as it stands to-day, he is
far from having mastered what it will be ten years from
to-day. The period of legal education never ends. The
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frontier recedes before each new step in advance.
We have made adequate provisions for enabling young
men to fit themselves to begin the practice of law and have
established elaborate safeguards to require such fitness.
We have made no provision for the continuance of a lawyer's education after he has been admitted to the bar. That
has been left as it almost necessarily must be left, to his
own initiative, and, in many cases, that initiative has been
lacking.
The failure of lawyers to continue their studies after
admission to the bar is, I think, the principal cause of the
conditions which have caused such deep and widespread
discontent among lawyers themselves, with the bar, with
its fitness, and its activities.
It is an honorable discontentment bred in us by devotion, not by captiousness or hostility or by an unreasonable impatience to set things right.
We are not critics of the bar but its members and
friends. We are neither cynics nor pessimists, but honest
members of a great calling of whose slightest deterioration
we are jealous. We would like to keep the finest instrumentality for justice and social service in our national life
from falling short of its best.
I think that to do this we must make the bar a home
for the spirit of learning. It must become a community of
scholars and students. I am not suggesting that lawyers
be dragooned into becoming pedants. I have in mind no
species of artificial compulsion. I am simply advocating
that lawyers should expose themselves to stimulating influences of scholarship and introduce themselves into comforting comradeship of the republic of learning.
Ours is a noble profession, with a great historic background and a splendid tradition of learning. There are
modern tendencies which are tearing down the practice of
law from its proud place as a learned profession. These
tendencies must be counteracted by again placing emphasis
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upon great learning in the profession. They will be effectually checked if lawyers enrich their thinking and living
by reading from the bountiful stores of literature which
surround them.
May I speak to you, then briefly, upon the reading
of a lawyer.
We all have prepared briefs and paper books. To some
of them we have given great attention, and when they
were finished, we have regarded them as masterpieces,
possessing both clearness of thought and felicity of expression.
It would be well, however, for all of us to read some
of Wigmore on Evidence to see how he has briefed every
rule of the law of evidence, discovering its source; tracing
its history; giving the reasons upon which it might be
supported and those which could be urged against it; and
showing the modifications which had been made to it by
decision and statute; and how clearly and accurately and
forcibly he has stated the results of his investigations.
When we have done so, I am sure we will regard
some of our own efforts as superficial and inadequate; and
we will approach the task of preparing our next brief with
a higher standard of perfection and with an ambition to
approximate more nearly that standard.
We live in an era of cases. The number of the reports
of cases which are published every year is legion, and to
these are to be added the digests and keys and citators.
We have been trained for the practice of law by a study
of cases, and we are apt to think that every possible question of law has been decided somewhere and has been
.decided finally and conclusively.
The result is that the practice of law has become, in a
large measure, a mechanical search for precedents, instead
of a thoughtful application of, and a reliance upon, principles of human conduct and interpretation which underlie
all precedents. Lawyers have turned aside from the con-
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sideration of the principles of law to study particular instances of their application, sought out not for purposes
of illustration but for use as authority.
The result is very harmful. It lengthens the brief of
lavyers; it deadens the tone of their arguments in court.
It makes case lawyers whose minds move in a narrow
circle.
It will help us, I think, if we read some of a great
book like Williston on Contracts. From it we will learn
that many important questions in the law of contracts, as
in all other branches of the law, have not been conclusively
decided. It will show us that new rules are being every day
enunciated so that there is hardly a rule of to-day but can
be matched by its opposite of yesterday. We will be surprised to learn how many great legal victories have been
won against what seemed to be an immovable mass of
precedent. We will arise from our reading convinced that
the duty of a lawyer is not to match the colors of many
sample cases spread out upon his desk, adopting for use
the case which supplied the colors nearest in shade to
those of his own.
No system of living law could survive the continuance
of such a process. No lawyer worthy of his profession
can view the function of his calling so narrowly. If that
were all there is to the practice of law, there would be
little intellectual interest about it. The man who had the
best card index of the cases would be also the best lawyer.
But such is not the case.
It is when the colors do not match, when the references
index fail, when there is no decisive precedent
the
in
that the serious business of a lawyer begins, and the occasions for the performance of this serious business are
ever increasing in number.
For every tendency in the law there seems to be a
counter tendency; for every rule its antinomy. Nothing
is stable. Nothing is absolute. All is fluid and changeable.
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There is a change from decade to decade and from day to
day. The great glacier of legal development moves slowly
on.
We must keep apace with this development. Indeed
we must anticipate its progress. And for this we must
prepare ourselves by something more than a study of detached and isolated cases.
Such at least is the lesson I have learned from reading
some of the great law books of the present day.
"How forcible are right words," said the prophet Job.
Certainly we will agree with the English court that "There
is not a more fruitfur source of error in the law than the
inaccurate use of language." Yet the language of the law
is unspeakably obscure, and has been for so many years
that we are apt to think that it is necessarily so. But if
we read law books like Pomeroy's Equity or Kenny's Criminal Law, we will learn that the law may be stated with
clarity and felicity and grace of diction, and with a sprightliness-and vigor equal to that of a romance; and we will
arise from our reading fully convinced that an improvement
in our literary style, as well as in that of our opponents
at the bar and the judges before whom we practice, is
highly desirable.
I have endeavored to illustrate some of the incidental
advantages which accrue to one from the reading of law
books. But in addition to reading law books, strictly speaking, one should read books about the law.
Most of us were much surprised to learn that the
legislature of 1927 had abolished the necessity for a consideration for the binding effect of a written promise. For
over four centuries, consideration had been essential to the
validity of an unsealed promise. For years, a study of the
particulars of this requirement had been one of the most
important and difficult things which confronted the law
student and lawyer.
If, however, we had carefully considered the subject,
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we would not have been surprised that the legislature had
acted, but that it had waited so long to act. We would
have seen that analytically and logically there was no
justification for the requirement of consideration, and that
its explanation could be found only in the recesses of legal
history which we had always carefully shunned.
And reading the history of the law for this purpose
we will be surprised to learn how many present day legal
conceptions owe their existing form almost exclusively to
history; how many principles of law are not to be understood except as historical growths.
The history of the law illuminates the past, and in
illuminating the past it illustrates the present, and in illustrating the present illuminates the future.
"Nowadays," says Maitland, "we may see the office of
historical research as that of explaining, and therefore
lightening, the pressure that the past must exercise upon
the present and the present upon the future. To-day we
study the day before yesterday in order that yesterday may
not paralyze to-day, and to-day may not paralyze tomorrow."
There are many legal conceptions which embody the
thought of the past rather than the present, which, separated from their past, seem arbitrary and unintelligible
and in the study of which there can be no progress without
history.
The principles of real property are intelligible only
in the light of history. They derive from history the impetus which must shape their subsequent development. The
law of contract is full of history. The distinction between
larceny and embezzlement, the rules of venue and jurisdiction, the powers and functions of an executor, are a few
of the growths which history has fostered and which history
must tend to shape.
May I not then recommend for your perusal such books
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as Holdworth's History of English Law, or Walsh's History
of American Law?
A few weeks ago, I had the good fortune to see the
magnificent collection of paintings bequeathed by the late
John G. Johnson to the city of Philadelphia.
My enjoyment and appreciation was greatly increased
by the fact that I was accompanied by an artist, who explained the pictures to me, pointing out in almost every
case how the beauty and strength of the foreground of
the picture was accentuated and intensified by the shading
and coloring of the background of the picture.
The law too has its background. The science of the
law cannot be learned merely by a study of the particular
rules which stand in the foreground, The universal and
general rules which lurk in the background must be studied
in order that we may discover what the particulars mean
and whence they sprang.
In the present period of flux and change and developm'ent, in order that the progress of the law in adapting
itself to new conditions and emergencies may be logical
and consistent, it is necessary that fundamental conceptions be analyzed more clearly and their philosophical implications and their logical conclusions be more clearly
understood.
May I not then suggest for your attention, such books
as Salmond's Jurisprudence or Gray's Nature and Source
of the Law?
The law of every country in the civilized world is
based either on the Roman law or the English common law.
Each system has contributed to the other, but the two
systems have often competed with each other for supremacy. It is one of the glories of the common law that in
these conflicts it has almost always proved victorious.
Louisiana alone of all the States carved from the Louisiana
Purchase preserves the French law. In Texas only a few
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anomalies of procedure serve to remind us that another
system once prevailed. In California only the institution
of community property remains to tell us that Spanish law
once obtained in that jurisdiction. Only historians know
that the custom of Paris once governed Michigan and
WVisconsin.
There are many signs that the common law is imposing itself upon the French rule in Quebec. In everything
but terminology it has overcome the Roman law in Scotland, and there is abundant evidence that the common law
is superceding the Roman law in South Africa, in Porto
Rico, and in the Philippines.
What are the merits of the common law, as compared
wvith the Roman law, that make ,it succeed in moulding
rules of law everywhere, whatever their origin, to accord
with its principles?
It will be of great interest and assistance to a lawyer,
if, in some stage of his legal education he endeavors to gain
some acquaintance with the Roman law.
An American lawyer has the advantage of splendid opportunities for this study. A bureau of the American Bar
Association has been created to promote it. A number of
books have recently been written especially to facilitate
it. Of these books, I recommend for your leisure and convenience Radin on Roman Law.
Psychology is a modern fad. Much of what we formerly called human nature and common sense has recently
been dignified and exalted by calling it psychology.
In .this science there seem to be many conclusions, but
no data upon which to base them. But students of it are
making great claims.
They have complained bitterly because the bench and
bar have not availed themselves of its principles, its
methods and its processes.
"The progress of psychology makes it an absurd incongruity," it is said, "that the State through its courts
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should devote its fullest energy to the clearing up of all
physical happenings, but never ask the aid of an expert
psychologist to help them."
Lawyers should know something of this science for
which so much is claimed. They should know something
of the criticisms which its advocates have made upon the
law and of the answers which may be made to these criticisms. The literature upon the subject is abundant and increasing. One may profitably begin by reading Munsterberg's On the Witness Stand, and the annihilating reply
thereto written by Prof. Wigmore.
For many years, the courts sedulously disclaimed any
law making power. Their function, they asserted, was not
to make the law, but to expound and apply it.
Later this came to be regarded as a discreet fiction
and later as a childish and archaic fiction. The courts
recognized and admitted that much of our law originated
in and was made by the decisions of the courts.
Still later it has been asserted that the judges through
their power of interpretation and application make all of
the law, for they can make even the statutes mean what
they will.
Would you like to go behind the scenes and see the
judges engaged in this law making process? You may do
so if you will. You have only to read Judge Cardozo's
book, The Nature of Judicial Process, or Gray's book on
the Nature and Sources of the Law.
I have recommended the reading of law books and
books about the law. I am entirely conscious, however,
that lawyers must like other men abandon themselves now
and then, for mental ease and recreation, to the thrall
of fiction.
But you will not read all the novels. You cannot even
read all the good ones. You must select your novels, and
in making this selection why not choose those which will
mean something to you as a lawyer, which will have a
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special interest to you as a member of your profession?
Accordingly, I recommend to you the reading of legal
novels, and by a legal novel I mean a novel in which a
lawyer ought to be principally interested because the principles or practices of law form a principal part of the
author's scheme.
Those in which a trial scene is involved.
(1)
Those in which the traits and characteristics of
(2)
a lawyer or judge or the ways of professional life are
portrayed.
Those in which the methods of the law in prose(3)
cuting and punishing crime are set forth.
(4) Those in which some point of law enters into
and forms a part of the plot.
In this first class, I need only mention Bleak House, by
Dickens, with its famous chancery suit; The Heart of Midlothian, by Scott, with the trial of Effie Dean for murder;
Pickwick Papers, with its famous breach of promise suit,
Bradill v. Pickwick; and the Tale of Two Cities, with its
trial of Dornay for treason; Mark Twain's Puddinhead
Wilson, with its introduction of finger print evidence; the
Right of Way by Parker, and Eugene Aram which is
merely an elaborate transcript of a famous English trial.
In the second class are Guy Mannering, by Scott,
which gives us the traits of character of Advocate Pleeydell; Bleak House, which gives us Attorney Tulkinghorn;
Ford's Peter Sterling, which is said to reflect the career
of Grover Cleveland; Warren's Ten Thousand a Year,
with its famous law firm of Ouirls, Gammon and Snop,
and the Tutt books of Arthur Train.
Surely those of us who are interested in the prosecution and punishment of crime cannot afford to ignore Les
Miserables, by Hugo, or Paul Clifford. by Bulwer Lytton,
or Oliver Twist, or the Count of Monte Cristo, or the
Scarlet Letter, or Rob Roy, or Ninety-Three.
Galsworthy's To-Let is concerned with the rule against

1
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perpetuities; in Felix Holt, by George Elliot, the plot turns
upon the nature of a base fee in land; Mr. Meeson's Will,
by Haggard, raises the question of the validity of a will
which was tatooed upon a woman's back.
You will not misunderstand me. Lawyers do not go
to novels to learn the law and I do not recommend it. The
purpose I have in mind is a very different one. It is to
direct the attention of lawyers to the pleasure and need of
a class of reading which, while not strictly professional, is
diverting and entertaining, and which will be indirectly
profitable to them in their own special field of learning.
I the more emphatically recommend such reading because there are great movements of legal progress which
have been materially aided or reflected by the works of
great novelists. The abolition of chancery delays was
brought about by Dickens' Bleak House. The establishment of the crime of embezzlement may be treated to
Swift's Gulliver's Travels; and jail reform in England was
largely due to Charles Reade's Never Too Late To Mend.
Further, many of these legal novels depict history for
us, that is, scenes in legal annals which general history has
made famous.
From Ivanhoe, we learn of trial by battle; from the
Maid of Perth, we become acquainted with trial by ordeal;
in Barnaby Rudge, we learn of Lord Gordon's Riots, and in
Rienze, we again go over the times of the Roman Republic.
There are some of these legal novels which, when attentively read, cannot fail to inculcate legal ethics more
vividly than any search for precedent or the reading of
ethical rules, and which will at the same time search the
deepest emotions of our souls, and so more fully qualify
us to act our parts in the administration of law and the
securing of justice.
Finally, these legal novels will furnish us with a catalogue of life's characters. The lawyers must know human
nature. He must deal with types. He cannot find all of
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them around him. Life is not long enough. The range of
his acquaintance is not broad enough. For this learning
then, he must go to fiction which is a gallery of life's
portraits.
It has been suggested that every bar- association ought
to have a list of classic legal novels and at least one copy
of every such novel on its shelf. In this suggestion, I
concur.
Two centuries ago, Lord Holt, in deciding a rather
insignificant case, wrote a very lengthy opinion in which
he discussed and forecast the whole law of bailments. In
concluding, he stated that he had simply stirred these
points in order that wiser heads might settle them.
And so to-day I have simply stirred some points that
wiser heads may settle them.
I hope however that I have in some measure shown
the pleasure and positive and practical benefits to be gained
by reading.
WALTER HARRISON HITCHLER
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MOOT COURT
MARTEL v. ASHLEY
Contracts-Right of Infant to Avoid-Voidable Whether Beneficial
or Not
Contracts-Restraint of Trade, if Reasonable as to Time and Space,
Enforceable

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, an infant, entered into a contract of employment
containing a covenant not to engage in the plumbing business
within 18 months after the termination of the contract of employment. It was restricted to the local town of 5,000 people. The
defendant has begun to breach the contract and this is a bill in
equity to restrain him from further breach.
Brone, for plaintiff.
Segal: for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Rosenwald, J. The defendant seeks to avoid his covenant on
the grounds; first, that at the time of its execution, he was and
still is an infant and second, that it was contrary to the law as
being in restraint of trade.
As to the* defendant's first averment, that of infancy: it can
be stated as a general rule that the contracts of an infant are
voidable at his election. However, there are exceptional cases in
which his contracts have been held to be absolutely binding upon
him. Among these exceptions are contracts for service, of which
the case at bar is illustrative. These contracts have been held to
be binding on the infant because they are beneficial to him.
Now the question arises as to whether this contract was beneficial to the defendant, the infant. In disposing of this precise
question in a similar case, North J. in Evans v. Ware (1892) 3 Ch.
502; 67 L. T. R. 285 stated: "It is said that such a contract is
not for the benefit of an infant who signs it. That argument is
founded on a confusion of terms. It may be that such a contract
is not so much for the benefit of the infant as a contract for employment would be without any restriction on his part; but that
does not prevent a contract by which he gets employment, coupled
with a bargain on his part that he will not compete after his service
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ceases, from being beneficial to the infant. I am of the opinion
that such a contract is very beneficial. The reason is that if he
is able to make such a bargain, he obtains the means of earning
or continuing to earn his livelihood; he gets the employment which
he would not otherwise obtain, or continue to have, without being
subject to the restriction."
Likewise, in the case at bar the contract was certainly beneficial
to the defendant. In the first place, the infant obtained work, and
thereby he acquired the means of earning or continuing to earn
his livelihood. Secondly, he got the employment which he would
not otherwise obtain, or continue to have, without being subject to
the restrictive covenant. These views are in accord with the English
law as expressed in Bromley v. Smith, 2 K. B. 235 (1909) and the
New York Law as expressed in Mutual Milk and Cream Co. v.
Prigge, 98 N. Y. Supp. 458. See also 31 C. J. 1088 and 9 A. L. R. 1483.
The defendant by his second averment claims that the covenant
is void because it was contrary to law being in restraint of trade.
It is a well settled doctrine that any agreement in restraint of trade
is void as being against public policy, unless founded upon a valuable consideration. As regards time, space and the extent of the
trade; it must be limited to what is reasonable under the circumstances of the case, for the reason that such contracts tend to deprive the public of the services of parties in the positions in which
they are most useful and so tend to expose the public to the evils
of monopoly. Whether or not a contract is void, as being in restraint of trade and against public policy and whether the restraint
is reasonable, are questions of law for the court.
Regarded as a trade restriction, we find nothing objectionable in
this contract. It is based upon a valuable consideration, to wit,
employment at wages. It is partial in its operation being limited
in time and it is reasonable since the community at large is not
injuriously affected.
The defendant's claim, in which he objects to the unreasonableness of the length of time during which the covenant remains in
effect, is groundless, for in Erie County Milk Assn. v. Ripley, 18 Pa.
Super. 28, a contract was enforced restraining the driver of a milk
route from peddling or furnishing milk for one year in the city
of Erie.
In Philadelphia Towel Supply and Laundry Co. v. Weinstein,
57 Super. 290, it was held that where a laundry company employs a
driver on wages and commissions for a particular route, giving him
a list of the names and addresses of the company's customers along
the route, and the driver in consideration of the employment and
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his wages covenants not to engage on his own account, or as agent
for another, in the laundry business, in the district assigned to him
for one year after his employment ceases, such covenant will be
enforced by a court of equity if the driver attempts to violate it;
and this is true even though he may have voluntarily withdrawn
from his employment with the consent of his employer.
In Harlison v. Mawhinney, 8 Dist. 697, the court held that, a
contract made by an infant, not to go into the milk business for
one year after ceasing to be employed, could be enforced.
In view of the foregoing authorities we regard the defendant's
covenant as not being in restraint of trade and is binding upon him
despite his infancy. We therefore direct that an injunction be
granted, to continue for a period of eighteen months, in accordance
with the plaintiff's prayer.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
That the contract in question is one which equity would ordinarily
negatively enjoin can not be questioned. It is in restraint of trade,
but being limited in time and space will be enforced even tho the
services are not unique: Association v. Ripley, 18 Super. 28 and
Laundry Co. v. Weinstein, 57 Super. 290.
But the defence of infancy has been interposed. The court
below has adopted the view that, since the contract was beneficial
to the infant, it is valid and enforceable. The only Pennsylvania
authority cited is Harlison v. Mawhinny, 8 Dist. R. 697. We can find,
however, no warrant in the decided cases for the introduction of
any such doctrine into our law and the decided case cited none.
In cases too numerous for citation, since the earliest days, our
courts have held all contracts of an infant to be either totally void
or voidable. True, statements that infants are liable on their contracts for necessaries have appeared. That the ground of liability
in such a case is quasi- contractual, only for the reasonable value
of the goods furnished, is generally conceded. This may even be
avoided by an infant by returning the goods furnished: Sec. 2,
Sales Act.
To introduce into the law the question in each case whether
the court or jury may think that the contract is beneficial is to
introduce an element of uncertainty that should not be countenanced.
No good reason can be advanced for not permitting an infant to
avoid a beneficial contract as well as a detrimental one. It is an
option of the infant and whether exercised from caprice, ill-will, to
avoid loss, etc. should not concern the court.
Cream Co. v. Prigge, 98 N. Y. S. 458, was decided on the ground
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that the infant was under a duty of returning the consideration and
being unable to do so in such a case, was not permitted to rescind.
However, in Pennsylvania there is no such binding obligation to
redeliver the consideration. If impossible to return, the contract can
be avoided notwithstanding that fact: Ruchizky v. DeHaven, 97
Pa. 202 and Shaw v. Boyd, 5 S. & R. 309. See Cain v. Garner, 185
S. W. 122, (Ken.).
The contract being voidable and the infant not having ratified
the same, the defence of infancy must prevail. The judgment of
the learned court below is reversed.

GARDNER v. ROEFF
Contracts--Infancy-After Majority Voluntary Petition Filed in
Banlkuptcy-Claim of Plaintiff Listed-Question of Ratification
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff sold and delivered merchandise on credit to the
defendant, a minor, for resale. Four days after attaining majority,
the defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy listing the plaintiff as a
creditor for the contract price. He was adjudicated a bankrupt but
failed to receive a discharge. He is now sued in assumpsit and the
defense is infancy.
Peters, for plaintiff.
Reber, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Thomas, J. The facts have been clearly stated. In the case at
bar, the question as to whether or not a voidable contract had been
affirmed by the defendant after he had reached his majority is raised.
As the facts indicate, an infant had purchased goods on credit for
resale. The general rule is that all contracts made by one under age
of 21 are voidable at the election of the infant: The Peoples' Bank's
Appeal, 93 Pa. 107. So, the infant could disaffirm his obligations
under the contract, having the protection which the law throws
around an infant.
The infant may avoid the contract even tho he fraudulently
represented himself to be of full age, as he must have done in order
to secure credit: Neff v. Landis, 110 Pa. 204.
It is well settled that voidable contracts are regarded as valid
and binding until avoided, altho not enforceable by the party who
has executed his part of the contract until the infant reaches his
majority.
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under the contract, having the protection which the law throws
around an infant.
The infant may avoid the contract even tho he fraudulently
represented himself to be of full age, as he must have done in order
to secure credit: Neff v. Landis, 110 Pa. 204.
It is well settled that voidable contracts are regarded as valid
and binding until avoided, altho not enforceable by the party who
has executed his part of the contract until the infant reaches his
majority.
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In order that an infant may disaffirm his contract which has
been executed by the other party, he should return whatever has been
received: Shaw and Wife v. Boyd, 5 S. & R. 309. Here defendant
had not returned the goods; if he had, the plaintiff would not have
been able to bring this action in assumpsit.
The ratification of an executory contract by the infant, when he
becomes of age, must be by a distinct promise to discharge his
obligation: Chandler v. Glover's Administrator, 32 Pa. 510. We think
that the defendant ratified his contract when he filed a petition in
bankruptcy. Nothing in the facts leads us to believe that pressure
of creditors made him take such a course, and that his act was not
a voluntary one. In Section 3 (A), Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
it is said that an act of bankruptcy includes a petition of voluntary
bankruptcy; also, that this act must be committed by the insolvent
himself, or with his knowledge and consent.
The defendant was an adult at the time of the filing of his
petition of voluntary bankruptcy and every adult is presumed to know
the legal consequences of his acts. Section 3, Clause 5, of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provides that an act of bankruptcy is committed when a person has admitted in writing his inability to pay his
debts and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground.
The defendant, as required by Section 7, Clause 8, of the Act of 1898,
filed a schedule containing a list of creditors, with amounts due them,
under oath, in the court at the time of the filing of the petition of
voluntary bankruptcy. The defendant was adjudged a bankrupt,
which infers that the petition and schedule were properly filed and
acceptable to the court. The sections of the act were complied with,
and we are of the opinion that such acts by the defendant were
not inadvertent as contended for by his counsel.
The defendant admitted his liability, otherwise he would not have
been allowed to file his petition of voluntary bankruptcy. Section
4 (A) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provides that any person
who owes a debt may become a bankrupt. The court was satisfied
that the defendant owed debts, since his schedule of creditors was
accepted.
It is settled that a contract may be affirmed by words or conduct
which show an intention to be bound. Here the defendant conceded
that he was unable to pay his debts and acknowledged the plaintiff
as a creditor.
Dingee v. Becker, Federal Cases No. 3919, holds that the debt
may be collected if after adjudication the bankrupt is refused a discharge. The reason, no doubt, why the defendant was not allowed
a discharge was because he was not insolvent. Section 3 (C), Act of
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1898 provides that the solvency of the debtor may be a complete
defense to any proceedings in bankruptcy to have a debtor adjudged
bankrupt.
Dimock v. Revere Copper Co., 117 U. S. 559, holds that unless
a discharge is pleaded, the debt may be collected.
In Shannon v. Sterling Coal Co., 25 D. 672, an infant made a
settlement attested to by his next friend and upon -reaching majovity,
signed a release from further claims against the defendant for injury
received. Later, the Coal Company was sued and the plea of infancy set up; the court held that there was a ratification effected
when the release was signed.
The plea of infancy is one given by law for protection of a minor
and should not be used to allow one to receive benefits and not be
subject to liabilities.
These goods were not necessaries in our opinion; if they were,
the infant would be bound, and would have no defense, even tho he
had not done an act amounting to ratification. The law is that an
infant is bound by all contracts for necessaries: Johnson v. Lines,
6 W. & S. 80.
We render our verdict for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Was the inclusion by the defendant of the contract in question
as a claim against him a sufficient ratification to preclude the defence of infancy?
-Ratification of a contract made during infancy must be more
explicit and unequivocal than that needed to toll the Statute of
Limitations: Chandler v. Glover's Adm., 32 Pa. 509; Kelly v. Eby,
141 Pa. 177. The inclusion of the claim was not a promise to pay;
it was merely a recognition that a contract had been entered into
and that he was not able to discharge it by payment. It has been
held in several cases that inclusion of a barred debt in a schedule
of debts is not such a promise as will toll the Statute of Limitations:
Christy v. Flemington, 10 Pa. 129. It therefore could not bar the
defence of infancy: Chandler v. Glover's Adm., supra. It has
been held repeatedly that such a promise must be made to the
plaintiff or his agent, cases cited supra. While that could be obviated in the instant case by considering the trustee in bankruptcy
the agent of the plaintiff, this does not remove the other difficulty.
Our view is in accord with Sawyer Shoe Co. v. Braveman, 136
Atl. 290 (Me.), the only decided case on the precise question here
presented.
The judgment of the court below is reversed.
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COMMONWEALTH v. JANSON

Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy-Nolle Prosequi Ented by
District Attorney-No Objection by Defendant-Later Trial

Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article 1, Section 10
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On a prosecution for larceny, after the jury had been impaneled
and sworn, the district attorney, upon finding that he could not
secure the attendance of his principal witness, entered a nolle
prosequi, accused making no objection. The district attorney secured
a new indictment to which the accused pleaded former jeopardy.
The plea was overruled and the defendant appeals.
Backer, for Commonwealth.
Brady, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Brone, J. Jeopardy, within the meaning of the Constitution, is
the peril in which a defendant is placed when he is regularly charged
with crime before a tribunal properly organized and competent to try
him: Cow. v. Fitzpatrick, 121 Pa. 109; 16 C. J. 232. The Constitution
of the U. S. declares in the fifth amendment, "No person shall be
subject, for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." It is a known fact that this amendment was not designed as
a limit upon the state governments in reference to their own citizens,
but exclusively as a restriction upon federal power, that is, offenses
against, and trials under, the laws of the U. S.: Twitchell v. Penna. 7
Wall. 321; 16 C. J. 233. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has
adopted, almost verbatim, the clause appearing in the fifth amendment, in article 1, section 10 of the Constitution of 1874.
But Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that the plea of
former jeopardy is applicable only to capital offenses; McCreary v.
Com., 29 Pa. 325; McFadden v. Com., 23 Pa. 12; Com. v. Reese, 22
Pa. C. C. 411.
A capital offense is one for the conviction of which the state
demands a penalty of death. The only crime for which the state
of Pennsylvania demands death is murder. Here the defendant's
plea is former jeopardy after having been indicted for larceny, and
larceny being a felony, necessarily not within the strict interpretation
of the clause, the defendant's plea is unavailing: 1 Wharton's Criminal Law, 575.
In the comparatively recent case of Corn. v. Greavy, 75, Super. 131,
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(1920) Justice Porter states, "The plea of once in jeopardy is available to a defendant in capital cases only * * * (and what follows is
especially pertinent to the case at bar) * * * In felonies not capital,
the Constitutional provision does not prevent the discharge of a
jury without the consent of the defendant," and cites McCreary v.
Com. supra. And Mr. Justice Duncan in the very early case of Com.
v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 595, stated that, "Whenever the jury are charged
with a prisoner, where the offense is punishable by death, and the
indictment is not defective, he is in jeopardy of his life." The first
quotation is declarative of the existing law in Pennsylvania, and the
second gives added clarity to the rule by its negative wording. For
decisions to the same effect, see Hester v. Com., 85 Pa. 139; Com. v.
Markowith, 74 Super. 233.
The argument has been put forth that after a jury has been impaneled and sworn, the entry of a nolle prosequi by the district attorney will operate as a bar to a subsequent indictment for the
same crime. The proposition is correct, but is subject to the qualification "only in the cases of capital felonies.": Coin. v. Cook, supra;
Com. v. Clue, 3 Rawle 498; Hilands v. Com., 111 Pa. 1; Com. v.
Fitzpatrick, supra; Com. v. Greavy, supra. Counsel for defendant
has cited Com. v. Cawley, 4 Pa. Dist. 69, as authority. In that case
defendant was dismissed after being charged at a hearing with desertion, and pleads former jeopardy upon being brought to trial on
the same set of facts. From the evidence, it appeared that no cause
for detention existed, and therefore the judge properly dismissed the
case. This court is aware that when a justice has jurisdiction, a
conviction or acquittal before him is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Wharton's Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th ed. 438; Bishop's New Criminal Law 8th ed. 1029. Here the
nucleus of the plea is based on the issue of a nolle prosequi. A nol
pros is an entry made on the record, by which the prosecutor or
plaintiff, declares he will go no further in the criminal or civil action,
whichever it may be.
The case of Com. v. Hart, 20 N. R. 310 (Mass.) has also been cited
for authority under the same argument. There, no nol pros was
entered at all. Only an attorney, authorized by the commonwealth
to represent it, has authority to declare he will not further prosecute
a case in behalf of the commonwealth. The commonwealth had not
authorized an attorney to prosecute its case. The court went beyond
its power as a judiciary in attempting to assume the duty of a prosecuting officer, and "nol prossed" the complaint. In effect, what they
did was to acquit the defendant in discharging the complaint.
Assuming the law to be as defendant states it (that the plea of
former jeopardy is not limited to capital crimes) shall we admit that
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defendant was placed in jeopardy when the nol pros was issued-defendant making no objection? I think not. Counsel for defendant
argues that some affirmative act indicative of consent is necessary to
support the contention that the issuance of the nol pros is no bar
to a subsequent prosecution-that mere passiveness will not give
consent. The authority of the prosecuting officers in case of a felony
to enter a not pros after a trial has begun, and before a verdict, is
subject only to the right of defendant to insist on going on with the
trial; and if he does not so insist a nol pros operates only to discharge the particular indictment under which he is being prosecuted,
and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense: 16
C. J. 249. The effect of the entrance of the nol pros is entirely in
defendant's power, dependent upon his objection or affirmance, either
implied or express. The guilty have no right to complain and the
innocent are not injured thereby. The rule is fair and just.
We have found nothing in the facts or contentions calling for
further notice, and the decision of the lower court in overruling the
plea is affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned court below has held that the plea of the former
jeopardy may not be made except in cases of capital effenses. While
the early cases and some of the later ones have made such statements, they were applying the Constitutional provision against double
jeopardy. Such decisions do not negative the existence of a rule
based on justice and equity originating in the Common Law. In
Comm. v. Hetrick, 1 Woodward (Pa.) 288, "In criminal cases, not
capital, a reasonable necessity will justify the discharge of the jury
and a continuance of the cause, leaving the defendant still liable
to trial and conviction". This case held that such a discharge granted because the principal witness of the Commonwealth proved incompetent was not such reasonable necessity. This view has been
approved in Comm. v. Keeper of Prison, 76 Super. 98, where it was
said that the plea of former jeopardy applies in cases of crimes of
minor grade, altho not with the same force. The law does not approve
the discharge of a jury on failure of the prosecution to produce
proofs. See also Comm. v. Wible, 2 D. & C. 467; Comm. v. Erb,
44 C. C. 179; Comm. v. Arner, 149 Pa. 35. McCreary v. Comm., 29
Pa. 323 was a case of reasonable necessity and its general statements
have no binding force.
Many of the cases cited can be distinguished in that the pleas
were of former conviction or acquittal.
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed.
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SMITH v. ROBINSON
Landlord and Tenant-Breach by Landlord of Covenant to RepairPersonal Injuries of Tenant-Action of Assumpsit for
Breach only-No Recovery in Damages for Injuries
STATEMENT OF FACTS
let to Henry Smith certain premises to be used
Robinson
James
as a dwelling house, and covenanted to make the necessary repairs.
The landlord failed to make the repairs agreed upon, and the tenant sustained personal injuries by reason of the defective condition
of the premises. In an action to recover damages for such injuries,
the Court instructed the jury that the plaintiff's right of action was
for breach of contract and that damages for personal injuries were
not recoverable.
Bennethum, for plaintiff.
Bash, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Boswell, J. A covenant in a lease required the landlord to make
the necessary repairs and by his failure to make them his tenant
sustained personal injuries. An action to recover damages was instituted by the tenant against the landlord. The case is now before this court by reason of the court below instructing the jury
that, "The plaintiff's right of action was for breach of contract
and that damages for personal injuries were not recoverable."
There are not any cases in the State of Pennsylvania dealing
with the point in question, except Widener v. Roeper, 25 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 876 and Hahn v. Roach, 7 Northampton Co. Rep. 21. But these
cases do not establish the law, as opinions of the District Courts are
not opinions which become laws by reason of the State Constitution
of Pennsylvania. Consequently, this court is constrained to ascertain the decisions rendered in the Superior Courts of other states in
cases involving the same question that is now before us.
It is the law of this state that in the absence of a covenant to
make repairs the lessor is under no obligation to make them: Moore
v. Weber, 71 Pa. 428; Huber v. Baum, 152 Pa. 626; Levine v. McClenathan, 246 Pa. 374; Levin v. Philadelphia, 277 Pa. 560; Federal Metal
Co. v. Alpha Sign Co., 289 Pa. 175. When a lease is executed containing a covenant for repairs by the landlord, there is then a contractual relation and an obligation upon the landlord to make same.
The making of a contract for repairing premises by landlord,
does not create his legal liability in tort which did not previously
exist between the contracting parties: Fiorstino v. Mason, (Mass.)
124 N. E. 283; Miller v. Rinalds, Sup. Ct. App. T. 21 Misc. (N. Y.)
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470; Dustin v. Curtis, 74 N. H. 266, 67 Ati, 220.
And in Wood v. Sharpless, 174 Pa. 588 it was held that in the
event of a breach of covenant in a lease by the landlord, it was the
duty of the tenant to fulfill the terms of the covenant and his remedy
would be an action for costs or a deduction of the same from the
rent. And it would follow that a failure of the tenant to make
such repairs would be contributory negligence and a complete defense to any action he instituted in tort against the landlord.
Plaintiff's counsel contends that the landlord had notice of the
condition of the premises, but as there are no facts in this case as
to such notice, if pertinent, it is not necessary to consider that question.
Two rules have been applied in this state as to the measure of
damages when there has been a breach of covenant. One being as
stated in Pennsylvania Iron Co. v. Diller, 113 Pa. 635, which reads
in part as follows:
"The value of the lease or any part of it is not the measure of
damages to which the plaintiff is entitled for the breach of a particular covenant."
But this rule does not seem to have been followed when dealing with the question of covenants. The other rule as found in
Trickett on Landlord and Tenant, page 83 sets forth that:
"In a majority of cases in which damages for breach of the lessor's covenant, that the premises are, or, by means of repairs and
improvements, shall be put and be preserved in a certain state, are
sought, it has been held that the proper measure of damages is the
difference between the worth of the premises in the condition in
which they are, the covenants being unperformed, and their worth
in the condition in which they would have been had the covenants
been performed."
The above rule is recognized in Fairman v. Flunk, 5 Watts 516;
Warner v. Caulk, 3 Wharton 193; Wayne v. Napp, 180 Pa. 278;
Jackson v. Farrell, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 31.
It is generally held, and is explicit of the recognized rule of
Pennsylvania, that in cases of contract or covenants, damages for
personal injuries sustained, by reason of breach, are too remote and
speculative and not in the contemplation of the parties at the time
the contract was made and therefore not recoverable: 36 C. J. 208,
Par. 882; 16 R. C. L. 1059, Par. 580; Tuttle v. Gilbert Manuf'g Co.
13 N. E. Rep. 465 (Mass.); Edwards v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co., 98 N.
Y. 248.
The charge of the Judge to the jury of the lower court was cor-
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The county court decisions of Widener v. Roeper, 25 D. R. $76
and Hahn v. Roach, 7 Northampton Co. 21, while not binding on us,
except as their reasoning is binding, control the instant case. The
conclusions there reached being based on sound reasoning and buttressed by the decisions of several jurisdictions are followed by us.
The remedy of the tenant lies in assumption only, and then only for
the cost of the repairs and not for the personal injuries suffered, the
latter being too remote.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH v. NOLL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was arrested while taking a drink from a bottle furnished by a guest in defendant's house and convicted under the
Snyder Act for illegal possession. He now appeals, claiming no possession within meaning of act was shown.
Miernicki, for Commonwealth.
Cotsack, for Defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
W. R. Thompson, J. This case comes before us on an appeal
from conviction of the defendant. It appears that the defendant
Noll was arrested while taking a drink from a bottle in his dwelling
house. On the trial below evidence was adduced from which it appeared that the bottle from which Noll was drinking when arrested
was the property of a guest, who at the time was being entertained
in the defendant's house.
The bill of errors alleges that possession within the meaning of
the Snyder Act was not shown and this is the sole question to be
considered.
From the briefs of the counsels and our own search we venture
to say that this case is one of first impression in Pennsylvania; and
since it is such, it must be broadly considered from every possible
viewpoint.
The Snyder Act, so called, became law on March 27, 1923 and is
found in the pamphlet laws of that year on page 34. The section
under our immediate scrutiny is number four which provides-"That
it shall not be unlawful to possess intoxicating liquors-in ones bona
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fide dwelling-provided, such liquor was acquired prior to the passage
of this Act, and is for the personal use of his family-and guestswhich entertaining shall not be unlawful furnishing. Provided, proof
of possession of such intoxicating liquor shall be prima facie evidence
that same was acquired, used, and possessed in violation of this Act."
Further, the Snyder Act being a penal act must be strictly construed. Commonwealth v. Berdinella, 288 Pa. 510.
Considering first, authority from cases of states having statutes
similar to our own Snyder Act we came on cases from three jurisdictions, with facts similar to the case instant. These three states
are Michigan, Mississippi, and Washington.
As to the Michigan case-People v. Germaine, 208 NW 705 the
facts are-the defendant was riding in another's car in which there
was some liquor and the presence of which the defendant was aware.
The defendant was arrested for illegal possession and was convicted
in the lower court, but that verdict was set aside on appeal to the
Supreme Ct. of Michigan which held that the possession of intoxicating liquors belonging to a companion and the mere taking of a
drink was not sufficient to constitute illegal possession.
The Mississippi case comes still closer to our facts where it was
shown that the defendant went to B's house and while there carried
a bottle of intoxicating lquor into another room in which he and B
drank several times. The liquor belonged to B the householder. It
was held here that the carrying of a bottle of whiskey owned by
another into another room for the purpose of taking a drink does
not constitute illegal possession. Ricks v. State, 111 So. 752.
The last jurisdiction to be considered, Washington, in State v.
Jones 194 Pac. 585 presents a case identical with the one at bar.
There the defendant was arrested while drinking from a bottle
brought into his house by a guest. It was there held that one who
partakes of hospitality by drinking does not have illegal possession of
liquors. For further discussion of these principles see American
Digest of La--"Intoxicating Luiquors" Key 139.
Considering now our own state, we finid but one case that is
somewhat similar to the present one. That is Con1. v. Dombkowski,
86 Superior 468, wherein the defendant was indicted for illegal possession in violation of the Snyder Act. The officers seized a quantity
of liquor in his house and arrested him. At the trial the defendant
put in evidence the fact that the liquor was owned by a guest at his
house which guest testified that it was hers and that defendant had
no knowledge of it. The trial court charged that such evidence, if
believed, would acquit the defendant. Evidently the jury did not
believe the witness because he was convicted and on appeal, the lower
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court was affirmed.

The difference between that case and the one

in hand is the element of knowledge. The text books define possession as the power and intent to control. This is so common that it
needs no reference. What difference would it make if the defendant
knew of the guest having the.liquor? In our opinion, none. Furthermore, the fact that the guest should wish to share with his host a
few amicable drinks is no ground for holding that the host was in
illegal possession of the liquor.
By the Snyder Act the burden of disaproving illegal possession
is upon the defendant and unless he offers a sufficient and reasonable excuse he will be convicted. Commonwealth v. Croce, 89 Superior 249.
From the above conclusions we hold that defendant, Noll, had
successfully met and overcome the prima facie case of the Commonwealth by proving the liquor to have belonged to his guest and
the lower court erred in failing to charge to that effect.
The judgment of the court of Quarter Sessions is reversed and
the record is remitted to that tribunal with directions to grant a
new trial.
OPINION OF SUPREME

COURT

The learned court below has held that the Commonwealth made
out a prima facie case under the Snyder Act which the defendant
has rebutted by showing ownership in the guest. This overlooks the
fact that if a prima facie case had been made out, that entitled the
Commonwealth to have the case decided by the jury and their verdict
of guilty would have to be sustained as failure to believe the defendant would justify conviction.
We reach the same result but by other reasoning. The mere
finding of the liquor in the premises of the defendant raised no presumption of possession by him nor shifted any burden of proof to
him. The Commonwealth must then have relied on his manual control of the bottle while taking a drink. To hold that such was the
possession contemplated by the Snyder Act would be going far. It
would read into the Act another offense not therein included-taking
a drink of intoxicating liquor. They might easily have provided for
such an offense and their failure to so do is very persuasive of their
intent not to have such an act deemed illegal. If such is possession,
liability can only be avoided by proof of legal possession prior to
the act for it was concededly not kept for medicinal purposes. Possession includes more than mere physical handling. The latter might
well be called custody only. To constitute possession there must be
a claim to the exclusion of the control of others, either perpetually
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or for some limited time. That there could be no such exclusive claim
here is apparent. Thus possession includes a mental as well as physical element. While the latter is present here the former is entirely
absent. No possession having been shown the trial court should have
directed an acquittal.
There is no Pennsylvania authority on the instant point. In addition to the cases cited by the learned court below, see People v.
Ninehouse, 194 N. W. 973 (Mich.) and People v. Leslie, 214 N. W.
128 (Mich.).
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Contracts in the Local Courts of Medieval England by Robert
L. Henry, Judge of the Mixed Courts, Alexandria, Egypt. Formerly
professor of law in the Universities of Louisiana, Illinois, North
Dakota and Iowa. Published by Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd.,
London, 1926.
The scope of this book is narrowly limited. It coincides contracts; and only in the local courts of England, and only during
the period from A. D. 602 to A. D. 1485. The topics considered are
Pleading, Wager of Law and Witness Proof, Inquest Proof, Pawl
Recognizance in court, Tally, Documentary Acknowledgement made
out of court, Covenants of Warranty, Pledge, Contract and Surety
Promise; Delivery, Promise, and Covenant of Services, Bargain with
God's Penny or Earnest. Much interesting material is found in
the book under these headings. The book is rather sparingly supplied with explanatory passages, and to obtain an intelligible view of
the contents of the chapters is for that reason, difficult. The volume
however, exhibits the results of painstaking explanations of the
available medieval authorities.
The Law of Radio Communication, by Stephen Davis, Solicitor
of the Department of Commerce, formerly Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of New Mexico. Published by McGram-Hill Book
Company, Inc., New York and London.
This book of 106 pages, treats, in eleven chapters, of Present
Conditions, the Right to engage in Radio Communication, Federal
Jurisdiction, Federal Statutes prior to the Radio Acts of 1927, State
Jurisdiction, Conflicting Rights in Reception and Transmission,
Broadcasting of Copyright Matter, Control of Broadcast Programs,
Libel and Slander, International Law.
The Act of February 23rd, 1927 is printed in the Appendix. Unusually clear and terse, this book presents in very convenient form
the law thus far developed on this already, and steadily increasing,
important subject. Referring to communications by radio from one
individual to another, (point-to-point service) the author states that
circuits are operated between the United States and the principal
countries of Europe, South and Central America, and across the
Pacific to Hawaii, and Asia. The jurisdiction of Congress over this
activity, says the author, is the jurisdiction over interstate and international commerce. Communication by radio, is not distinguishable
in either legal or commercial effects, from its wire competitors. * * *
The radio, wire telegraph, telephone and cable companies are in the
common business of conveying messages from one person to another
by electrical processes, and legally they are of identical character".
The perusal of this volume may be earnestly commended to such
as are interested in this marvelous function.
. States' Rights and National Prohibition, by Archibald E. Steven,
son. Published by Clark Boardman Company, Ltd., 1927.
This interesting and able book, of 157 pages, does not consider
the question whether the 5th Article of the Constitution, authorizing
amendments, authorizes amendments to any previous enacted amendments. It distinguishes the 9th and 10th amendments from the others.
The 9th ordains that the mention of certain rights, retained by the
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states, shall not justify the denial of other rights, not conferred to
the United States. The 10th says, "The powers not delegated to the
United States by Constitution, nor prohibited by it to states, are reserved to states respectively or to the people". Therefore the author
concludes that they are a perpetual limitation on the Central government, which could not be renewed except apparently, by the unanimous action of the states. The writer does not say that an amendment inconsistent with the 10th amendment, must not be adopted by
states, and abolished, as to those states, the immunity given by the
10th amendment, and which should be invited as to any state failing
to ratify it. Connecticut, he thinks, not hhving adopted the 18th
amendment, can insist on exemption from its provisions. Perhaps
the ratification by the other states will not give the amendment
validity as to them, because the 5th article of the Constitution empowers no authority in Congress and the legislature of a state, to
deprive the state of jurisdiction over the subject of prohibition, but
this is not distinctly affirmed. The argument of the book is well
stated. How convincing it ought to be it is not necessary to indicate.
Students' Manuel of Bankruptcy Law and Practice by Lee E.
Joslyn, of the Detroit (Michigan) bar; lecturer in bankruptcy, at the
Detroit College of Law; and Referee in Bankruptcy. Published by
Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, N. Y.
A comparatively small book, containing 181 pages, this work
may be commended to the attention of students of law in law schools
and elsewhere. It is, as the author terms it, "a concise work on
Bankruptcy law". It has not been intended to cover "all the questions that may arise in the administration of large and complicated
estates" but to be a "model for conducting the ordinary Bankruptcy
case, voluntary or involuntary, through the court". The author
disavowing a work intended to rival Collier on Bankruptcy, claims
that "substantially all questions that usually arise in the ordinary
case in Bankruptcy have been discussed and covered".
The book is well supplied with references to cases, and its
plan of exhibiting the outlines of the topic, without descending to
masses of particulars, we think, with reference to students of law in
schools and offices, entirely commendable. This book is worthy
of the serious attention of instructors and learners.

